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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
-vs- : Case No. 
14678 
BLAINE OLSEN LARSON, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Blaine Olsen Larson, appeals from 
an order of the Fourth District Court denying his motion 
to withdraw a plea of guilty to a charge of knowingly and 
intentionally possessing marijuana, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On March 5, 1976, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
accepted appellant's change of plea from not guilty to guilty. 
RELIEr SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence rendered by the trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 19, 1975, a complaint was filed in 
Provo City Court charging the appellant with knowing 
possession of marijuana in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1953), as amended, and that appellant 
had been previously convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance, making the penalty provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2) (b) (ii) (1953), as amended, applicable (maximum 
sentence of one year in the county jail and $1,000 fine). 
Appellant was arraigned the same day and requested a 
preliminary hearing. On November 25, 1975, appellant 
appeared in the city court represented by his appointed 
counsel, Gary H. Weight, and waived a preliminary hearing. 
Appellant was bound over to the Fourth Judicial District 
Court. The Utah County Attorney filed an information in 
the district court alleging that "Blaine Larson knowingly 
and intentionally possessed a Schedule I controlled 
substance, to wit: marijuana." (R.47). On December 4, 
1975, appellant was arraigned in the District Court, and 
at this time the information was read to the appellant, 
and a copy was handed to him. On December 12, 197 5, the 
appellant entered a plea of not guilty, through his 
-2-
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appointed counsel, Gary H. Weight. On March 5, 1976, the 
appellant appeared before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
and requested a change of plea. The court conducted a 
thorough hearing before accepting the guilty plea. In 
response to the court's questioning, the appellant indicated 
that he understood the consequences of a plea, that it 
constituted a waiver of his right to a jury trial, and 
that the punishment imposed would not depend upon a guilty 
plea (R.31,32). The county attorney questioned the appellant 
to insure that he understood that a subsequent conviction 
might result in a felony charge (R.33). The appellant waived 
the reading of the information, and the court explained that 
the information generally charged the "offense of knowingly and 
intentionally possession (sic) marijuana." (R.33). The appel-
lant then stated that he was pleading guilty because he was 
guilty and for no other reason, and the court expressed its 
satisfaction that the plea was entered "freely and voluntarily, 
without any coercion, promises or threats of whatever nature 
. . . intentionally, and . . . with a full and complete under-
standing of the consequences." (R.34). Appellant was then 
referred to the Adult Probation and Parole Department for a 
pre-sentence investigation. On March 15, 1976, the appellant 
met with the probation agent and expressed his dissatisfaction 
-3-
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with the guilty plea (R.38). On March 26, 1976, Mr. Weight 
requested and was granted permission to withdraw as counsel. 
Appellant's new counsel, Larry N. Long, then addressed the 
court, and made a motion to withdraw his client's guilty 
plea. On April 2, 1976, a hearing was held on that motion, 
and the appellant testified in his own behalf. On April 6, 
1976, the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson issued a ruling that 
the plea was entered freely, voluntarily and understandingly f 
and denied the motion (R.28). Appellant subsequently filed 
a motion to reconsider the ruling, and an affidavit alleging 
that appellant had not knowingly possessed marijuana, that 4 
this fact was unknown to his original counsel and was only 
made known to his present counsel one day prior to his original 
appearance (March 26, 1976) (R.21). Appellant further alleged < 
that he had withheld the information because he thought it 
"irrelevant," but that as he had now been made aware that it 
constituted a defense, he wished to withdraw his plea. A < 
hearing was held on this motion on May 21, 1976, and the court 
relied on its previous ruling, refusing permission to withdraw 
the guilty plea. ' 
On May 28, 1976, the appellant was sentenced to one 
year in the county jail provided that after the expiration of 
-4-
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ninety days he could apply for a suspension of the unserved 
portion of the sentence (R.16). Appellant's previous 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance occurred 
on March 26, 1975. He was twenty years old at the time he 
entered the guilty plea at issue in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO PERMIT APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF 
GUILTY. 
Appellant has correctly stated the law that 
under the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3 (1953), as 
amended, and according to the great weight of authority, 
a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and that a criminal 
defendant may not withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of 
right. State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963). 
Appellant is contending, however, that this discretion is 
of such a limited scope that any motion made prior to 
sentencing, supported by an affidavit, must be granted, 
and that a refusal to do so amounts to a reversible abuse 
of discretion. 
-5-
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Respondent submits that this argument is faulty 
in two particulars. First, it assumes that a trial court 
must accept as true whatever self-serving allegations a 
criminal defendant may chose to make in order to escape the 
effects of his guilty plea. This Court has held that a 
trial court need not accept evidence offered by a defendant 
to show that a guilty plea was not voluntarily and intel-
ligently made. Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294f 452 P.2d 
323 (1969). Second, appellant's position, if adopted, would 
effectively deny the trial court the opportunity to exercise 
its discretion in determining whether the allegations warrant 
a withdrawal of the plea. The trial court's discretion would 
not be of any effect if a trial court could not discriminate 
between meritorious and obviously frivolous grounds for the 
withdrawal of a plea. 
Appellant's brief cites a plethora of authority 
where a trial court's refusal to allow a withdrawal of a guilty 
plea has been held an abuse of discretion. Respondent does 
not challenge these authorities ". . • as they do nothing more 
than to illustrate when, under given factual situations, the 
appellate courts have, or have not, seen fit to overrule the 
actions of trial courts in the exercise of the sound discre-
tion which the law vests in such tribunals." Plum, at 126, 672. 
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All of the cases are factually dissimilar to the case at 
bar. Appellant was at all times represented by a competent 
member of the bar who demonstrated an identity of interests 
with the appellant. At the time appellant entered his plea, 
he was an intelligent adult who had been previously convicted 
of the same offense. Such a previous conviction is evidence 
that the appellant understood the charge against him, the 
elements thereof, and the procedure in a criminal trial. 
Hahn v. Turner/ 530 P.2d 789 (Utah 1975); Combs v. Turner, 
25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P.2d 437 (1971); and Price v. Turner, 
28 Utah 2d 328, 502 P.2d 121 (1972). 
The information charging the appellant was clear, 
comprehensible to a layman, and set forth all the essential 
elements of the crime. The proceedings were not hurried, 
and no plea bargain was involved in obtaining appellant's 
plea. There was no fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct 
on the part of either counsel or the courts. 
The case of State v. Virgi, et al., 81 N.E.2d 295, 
84 Ohio.App. 15 (1948), upon which appellant most heavily 
relies, is not apropos. The case is decided as much upon 
the grounds that the trial judge received ex parte information 
via a telephone conversation with the prosecutor which caused 
him to withhold a tentative plea agreement as upon the grounds 
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cited by appellant. In addition, there were factors in 
the Virgi decis ion that are not present here* First* the 
defendants had discovered new evidence in the Virgi case. 
In this appeal, the information relied on by appellant was 
all available in his defense. Second, in the Virgi ease, 
the defendantshad made a credible allegation that they 
had misunderstood the nature of the charge and the effect 
of a guilty plea. Appellant can make no such claim in 
this appeal. 
Appellant has cited a number of older authorities 
that contain language to the effect that "all doubts should 
be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits." Respondent 
submits that the trend of the law is not in that direction. 
As the Washington Appellate Court has noted, the older rule 
developed at a time when trial courts used less exacting 
procedures for protecting a defendant's rights in accepting 
a plea of guilty. State v. Armstead, 13 Wash.App. 59, 533 
P.2d 147, 149 (1975). When the trial court has carefully 
safeguarded the defendant's rights before accepting a guilty 
plea, as it did in this case, the defendant should meet a 
heavier burden in a motion to withdraw it. The Washington 
Court has adopted the test that a defendant should establish 
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that a withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice* 
This is the standard recommended in the ABA Standards 
relating to Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, § 2.1 ((1968). 
These standards provide: 
"Withdrawal is necessary to correct 
a manifest injustice whenever the defendant 
proves that: 
(1) he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by 
constitution, statute, or rule; 
(2) the plea was not entered or rati-
fied by the defendant or a person authorised 
to so act in his behalf; 
(3) the plea was involuntary, or was 
entered without knowledge of the charge or that 
the sentence actually imposed could be imposed; 
(4) he did not receive the charge or 
sentence concessions contemplated by the plea 
agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed 
to seek or not to oppose these concessions as 
promised in the plea agreement; or 
(5) he did not receive the charge or 
sentence concessions contemplated by the plea 
agreement concurred in by the court, aod he 
did not affirm his plea after being advised 
that the court no longer concurred and being 
called upon to either affirm or withdraw his 
plea." 
The effective assistance of counsel will be discussed 
in Point II, infra. Appellant clearly does not come within the 
other provisions of these standards, and should therefore not 
be allowed to withdraw his plea. It is surely a better practice 
to use preventative rather than remedial practices in this 
area of the law, and to insist that a defendant's rights are 
fully protected at the time he enters the plea rather than 
~ Q -
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to provide an over-liberal remedy in the assumption they 
are not protected. 55 Colum.L.Rev. 366, 380 (1955). On % 
two occasions the trial court received evidence and heard 
arguments in support of appellant's motion, and on each 
occasion resolved the factual issue of the voluntariness Q 
of the plea against the appellant. This finding is 
supported by substantial evidence. The appellant was 
presented with an information charging him in everyday 4 
language with the intentional and knowing possession of 
marijuana. Appellant is an intelligent adult who has 
previously been convicted of that offense, and he stated € 
in open court that he understood the nature of the charge 
as explained to him by the trial court. Yet appellant 
claims he withheld the information that his possession i 
was not "knowing" because he did not think it was 
relevant. Appellant's further contention that his desire 
to withdraw his plea is based on Mr. Long's advice that he • 
had a defense is flatly contradicted by the record, as 
appellant expressed'his dissatisfaction with his guilty 
plea to the parole agent ten days prior to receiving ' 
the advice (R.20,38). 
-10-
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The indication in appellant's brief that questions 
as to the legality of the search should be a factor in determining 
the trial court's discretion is not well founded. A guilty plea 
waives all objections to the manner of obtainment of evidence. 
Mach v. State, 492 P.2d 670 (Okla.Crim. 1972); Still v. State, 
97 Idaho 375, 544 P.2d 1145 (1976). 
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial court's 
refusal to allow appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty was 
within the discretion granted that court by law, and supported 
by substantial evidence. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL; THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY. 
The second prong of appellant's argument that attempts 
to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court is 
novel. Appellant contends that the trial court must allow him 
to withdraw his guilty plea because he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel. It is not claimed that the counsel was 
incompetent, uninterested or unwilling to present the appellant's 
defenses. The claim of counsel's ineffectiveness is based on 
the fact that "he was not aware of certain pertinent facts which 
imbued defendant with a defense to the charge." Brief of 
Appellant, page 15. Appellant hopes to make his own non-disclosure 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of relevant facts to his admittedly competent counsel into 
an automatic ground for a withdrawal of a guilty plea. 4 
The adverse affect of such a rule upon the 
administration of criminal justice is obvious. Any 
criminal defendant could keep relevant facts from his ( 
attorney, and enter a plea of guilty hoping to prejudice 
the State's case by delay, or gain some advantage for 
himself or a codefendant by a plea bargain. The defendant f 
could then retain a new attorney, reveal his "newly" 
discovered defense, and withdraw his plea as a matter of 
right. Public policy demands that the criminal law not f 
be subjected to such an abuse. 
This is not to imply that a defendant may never 
withdraw a plea upon discovery of a defense, only that I 
such a judgment is best committed to the discretion of 
the trial court where the evidence can be best viewed and 
balanced. The trial court in this case gave a full and i 
fair hearing to appellant on this issue, its finding is 
supported by the evidence, and should not be disturbed 
on appeal. ' 
Appellant has cited the cases of In Re Cronin, 
336 A.2d 164 (Vermont, 1975), and State v. Kinchloe, 
87 N.M. 34, 528 P.2d 893 (1974). The court in the Cronin * 
case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings 
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a juvenile's motion to withdraw a plea of guilty. The 
court felt that there was a possibility that a misunder-
standing between the juvenile and his own attorney could 
reasonably have led the juvenile to believe he was being 
promised lenient sentencing in return for a plea of guilty. 
The court held that if the plea was induced by such an 
apparent promise, it was not voluntary and could be ' 
withdrawn* 
In Kinchloe, the New Mexico Court considered a 
list of ten allegations made in respect to a criminal 
defendant's counsel. The list included counselfs terminal 
illness, failure of counsel to discuss issues raised by 
the defendant, and counsel's manifest desire to "get the 
case over with." In light of all of the factors, the 
court held that defendant had received ineffective legal 
assistance. Neither of these cases come near establishing 
the principle that unawareness of certain facts is 
equivalent to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The case of Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d 
20 (10th Cir. 1967), is more in point. In that case, 
a criminal defendant had hoped to interpose a plea of 
not guilty by reason of insanity, and counsel had given 
-13-
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incorrect advice on the standard of mental responsibility. 
The defendant claimed that the incorrect advice had robbed 
his guilty plea of its voluntary character, and that he 
should be able to withdraw it. The Circuit Court affirmed 
the trial court's refusal to allow a change of plea. 
As this Court has made abundantly clear, a 
defendant is entitled to the assistance of a competent 
member of the Bar who shows a willingness to identify 
himself with the interests of the defendant and present such 
defenses that are available to him under the law and 
consistent with the ethics of his profession* Andreason 
v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 182, 493 P.2d 1278 (1972); Alires v. 
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969). This requirement 
is not met by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the 
record by an attorney who manifests no real concern about 
the interests of the accused. However, the requirement does 
not demand that the attorney's representation of the accused 
be perfect, of that he present the case exactly as the 
accused, with the benefit of hindsight, chooses to define 
as "effective." In this context, the language of Kryger v» 
Turner, 25 Utah 2d 214, 479 P.2d 477 (1971), is appropriate. 
In affirming the trial courtss denial of a writ of habeas 
corpus, this Court stated: 
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"In the instant action, there 
is no allegation that counsel's 
representation was a sham or a 
pretense, but merely an assertion 
that in retrospect counsel misapprehended 
the facts allegedly related by the 
plaintiffs and that he failed to inter-
rogate the plaintiffs in regard to certain 
particulars. Defense counsel actively 
participated through all the critical 
stages of the proceedings and admittedly 
conferred with plaintiffs as to many of 
the significant facts." 25 Utah 2d at 
218. 
The appellant in this action has not demonstrated 
or alleged that his counsel was ineffective by the standards 
established by this court. Respondent submits that the trial 
court's refusal to allow a change of plea be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, 
respondent respectfully submits that the refusal of the trial 
court to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea was well 
within the discretion granted that court by law. The judgment 
and sentence of the district court is without error, and 
respondent respectfully submits the same should be affirmed 
by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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